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Abstract
We study optimal monetary policy in an environment in which money plays a basic
role in facilitating exchange, aggregate shocks aﬀect households asymmetrically and
exchange may be conducted using either bank deposits (inside money) or ﬁat currency
(outside money). A central bank controls the stock of outside money in the long-run
and responds to shocks in the short-run using an interest rate policy that manages
private banks’ creation of inside money and inﬂuences households’ consumption. The
zero bound on nominal interest rates prevents the central bank from achieving eﬃciency
in all states. Long-run inﬂation can improve welfare by mitigating the eﬀect of this
bound.
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In this paper, we study optimal monetary policy in an environment in which money is essen-
tial and aggregate shocks aﬀect individual agents diﬀerentially. Exchange may be conducted
using either bank deposits (inside money) or ﬁat currency (outside money). A central bank
conducts a monetary policy with two components: It controls the issuance of inside money
by private banks by managing short-run interest rates and sets the trend inﬂation rate by
controlling the quantity of outside money. We show that both components of the central
bank’s policy are useful for maximizing welfare. Long-run inﬂation mitigates the eﬀect of
the zero bound and is necessary for the implementation of the central bank’s interest rate
policy.
In models in which money plays an explicit role as the medium of exchange, monetary
policy is typically modeled as direct control of the supply of ﬁat money. In many settings
this is natural as such a policy is equivalent to one based on the setting of nominal interest
rates. This analysis is not well suited, however, for understanding the reasons why central
banks use interest rates as their primary short-run policy tool (Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber
(2001)). A separate literature explores interest rate policies in models in which money plays
no explicit role and indeed may not even be present (Woodford (2003)). Here we focus on
a class of policies in which the central bank varies the interest rate in response to shocks
in the short-run and uses transfers only to maintain the long-run rate of inﬂation. Within
this class we characterize an optimal monetary policy for an economy in which money is
necessary for exchange.
Berentsen and Waller (2010) consider optimal monetary policies of a certain class using
an extension of the environment of Lagos and Wright (2005) in which anonymous agents
have access to a credit market. We extend their analysis by replacing the credit market with
a large number of identical private institutions which can both accept deposits and make
loans. These banks can create money through short-term loans in excess of their collected
deposits. The creation of bank deposits through this channel makes the money supply elastic
in the short-run even though the central bank is limited with regard to the frequency with
which it can make transfers.
In our economy, aggregate shocks aﬀect diﬀerently households who do and do not have
access to banks and who have diﬀerent incentives to save. Each period a fraction of house-
holds are excluded from interaction with banks and learn that they will exit the economy
immediately after trading. Households’ desire for insurance against ﬁnding themselves in this
situation generates both an essential role for money and the possibility of welfare improving
policy.
1Under the optimal policy, the central bank pays interest on the reserves of private banks
subject to two requirements. First, they must settle net interbank transactions in outside
money. Second, at the end of each period, they must demonstrate solvency, by which we
mean that any liabilities (deposits) must be matched by assets (loans and outside money).
By setting the rate at which it pays interest on reserves the central bank can control the loan
rate charged by private banks and thus the supply of inside money. Through this channel,
the central bank can raise and lower output and consumption in response to ﬂuctuations
in consumers’ marginal utilities. Interest rate movements thus redistribute wealth among
households by changing the value of existing holdings of outside money.
The ability of the central bank to control output through its interest rate policy is limited,
however, by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. The eﬀects of this bound can be
mitigated by maintaining suﬃciently high inﬂation on average. Inﬂation, the costs of which
are oﬀset by paying interest on reserves, enables the central bank to engineer negative real
interest rates when needed as described by Summers (1991) and others.
A large literature considers the issuance and acceptance of inside money in models in
which money functions as a medium of exchange (see, for example, Bullard and Smith
(2003), Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999, 2005); Freeman (1996a), He, Huang, and
Wright (2005); and Sun (2010, 2007)). This literature focuses to a large extent on the incen-
tive problems associated with acceptance and creation of inside money, devoting signiﬁcant
attention to the possibility of oversupply. To focus on the short-run elasticity of the money
supply and its role in monetary stabilization policy, we largely abstract from these issues.
Our solvency requirement eﬀectively eliminates the possibility of oversupply of inside money
in equilibrium.
In some ways, our work is closely related to that of Champ, Smith, and Williamson
(1996) and, especially, Freeman (1996b). We depart from Freeman in that we consider a
setting in which the central bank is limited with regard to both the frequency with which it
can make transfers and its ability to target them to particular households. These features
of our economy account for our main results: An interest rate based policy is not equivalent
to one employing transfers of outside money only; and an elastic money supply does not
necessarily lead to an eﬃcient outcome.
Our work also extends that of Berentsen and Monnet (2008), who study monetary policy
implemented through a channel system in a similar framework, in that we consider the role
of a private banking system in implementing monetary policy. Berentsen and Waller (2008)
also consider optimal monetary policy in a model in which the central bank supplies an
elastic currency in the presence of aggregate shocks. We, however, focus on the incentive of
some households to overconsume rather than on frictions associated with ﬁrm entry. In our
2economy, unlike those studied in these other papers, the zero bound imposes a signiﬁcant
impediment to monetary policy—indeed it is the factor which prevents the central bank from
attaining the eﬃcient outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment.
Section 3 analyzes households’ optimal choices. Section 4 deﬁnes a symmetric stationary
monetary equilibrium and presents an example in which the central bank sets nominal in-
terest rates to zero in all states and maintains a constant stock of outside money. Section
5 characterizes the optimal policy. The implications of this policy for long-run inﬂation are
considered in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and describes future work. Longer proofs and
derivations are included in the appendix.
2 The environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1,2,... etc.. Building on the environment introduced
by Lagos and Wright (2005), each time period is divided into n ≥ 2 distinct and consecutive
sub-periods the ﬁrst n − 1 of which are symmetric and diﬀerent from the nth. In each
sub-period of every period it is possible to produce a distinct good. All of these goods are
non-storable both between sub-periods and periods of time. To begin with, we describe the
case of n = 3, so that there are two initial sub-periods in which households are diﬀerentiated
by type in addition to the ﬁnal one in which they are symmetric. We will then describe the
eﬀects of eliminating one of the initial sub-periods. Adding more sub-periods (beyond three)
makes little diﬀerence and so we comment on it only brieﬂy at the end.
At the beginning of each period (comprised of three sub-periods) there exists a unit
measure of identical households. These households are then diﬀerentiated by type according
to a random process. Households are distinguished by type along three lines. First, each
household is active in only one of the ﬁrst two sub-periods. We assume that one-half of all
households are active in each of these sub-periods. Second, during the sub-period in which it
is active, a household is either a producer or a consumer. Finally, fraction λ of the households
learn at the beginning of the period that after acting as a consumer in one of the ﬁrst two
sub-periods they will exit the economy. These households have no access to the banking
system at any time during the current period. Let α denote the fraction of households that
act as consumers in one of the ﬁrst two sub-periods and do not exit the economy. The
fraction of households that act as producers in one of the ﬁrst two sub-periods is then given
by 1 − α − λ.
3Consumers active in sub-period j = 1,2 have preferences given by
u(cj) = Aju(cj) (1)
where u( ) satisﬁes u′(c) > 0, u′(0) = +∞, and u′(∞) = 0, and cj denotes consumption of
the sub-period j good in the current period. We will distinguish consumption by households
that exit in the current period from that of those that stay by superscripts: ce
j vs. cs
j. Aj is
a preference shock common to all consumers in a given sub-period of activity. This shock is
realized at the beginning of the relevant sub-period and independent over time. For j = 1,2,
Aj is non-negative, has compact support, and is distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function F(A) with density f(A).
Let yj denote the output of an individual producer active in sub-period j. Production
results in disutility g(y) where g′(y) > 0 and g′′(y) > 0. Producers derive no utility from
consumption during either of the ﬁrst two sub-periods. Unlike consumers, producers active
in diﬀerent sub-periods are entirely symmetric.
At the beginning of the ﬁnal (i.e. third) sub-period, λ new households arrive to replace
those who exited at the end of the previous two sub-periods. During this ﬁnal sub-period
all households can both consume and produce. Regardless of whether it was a consumer,
producer, or was not yet present earlier in the period, the household’s preferences are given
by
U(x) − h, (2)
where x is the quantity of sub-period three good consumed, with U′(0) = ∞, U′(+∞) = 0
and U′′(x) ≤ 0. We assume that the sub-period 3 good can be produced at constant marginal
disutility and interpret h as the quantity of “labour” used to produce one unit of the good.
Linear disutility plays the same role here as in Lagos and Wright (2005).
In all sub-periods, exchange takes place in Walrasian markets. In the ﬁrst two sub-periods
households are anonymous to each other. As a result, cannot credibly commit to repay trade
credit extended to them by either sellers or other buyers. Anonymity motivates the need for
a medium of exchange in the ﬁrst two sub-periods. In the ﬁnal sub-period, households are
not anonymous, trade credit is in principle feasible, and there is no need for a medium of
exchange.1
In addition to households, there also exists in the economy a large ﬁxed number, N, of
private institutions which we will refer to as banks. Banks are owned by households and
act so as to maximize dividends, which are paid during the ﬁnal sub-period of each period.
Private banks are able to recognize in the ﬁnal sub-period households with whom they
1We will refer to the ﬁnal sub-period as the frictionless market, and the preceding sub-periods as periods
of anonymous exchange.
4have contracted in either of the sub-periods of anonymous exchange. Similarly, households
are able to ﬁnd banks with which they have contracted earlier in the period. This, together
with an assumption that contracts between banks and individual households can be perfectly
enforced enables private banks feasibly to take deposits and make loans within a time period.2
The institutions that we refer to as banks function much as the credit market in Berentsen,
Camera, and Waller (2007) and Berentsen and Waller (2010,b). The key diﬀerence here is
that we allow these institutions to extend loans in excess of their deposits. They will do
this by creating deposits which function eﬀectively like checking accounts. We will refer to
these deposits as inside money. We do not consider the possibility of private bank notes and
exclude them by assumption.
There also exists in the economy an institution which we refer to as the central bank.
Unlike the private banks described above, the central bank does not have the ability to
identify and contract with households during the sub-periods of anonymous exchange. The
central bank can, however, interact with private banks at any time and has the ability both
to enforce agreements into which it has entered with these banks and to impose taxes upon
both banks and households in the ﬁnal sub-period.
The central bank maintains a stock of ﬁat money which can in principle serve as a medium
of exchange in any sub-period. Let Mt denote the quantity of ﬁat money in existence at the
beginning of period t. At the beginning of the initial period, all households are endowed
with equal shares of this money. Central bank money will be referred to as outside money
to distinguish it from the deposits created and maintained by private banks.
Timing
Figure 1 depicts the timing of events within period t under the assumption that there
are two sub-periods of anonymous exchange. Agents enter the ﬁrst sub-period owning shares
in banks and holding any outside money acquired during period t − 1. At the beginning
of the period households are randomly divided by type as described above. Immediately
thereafter, households who are not exiting the economy this period may access the banking
system. That is, they may take out a loan from a bank, make deposits and/or shift deposits
among banks. At this time banks may also interact with the central bank if they so choose.
Exchange then takes place among those consumers and producers who are active in the ﬁrst
sub-period.
Buyers may purchase goods with either outside money or bank deposits. To the extent
2Because households which exit have no access to banks within their ﬁnal period in the economy, there
is no possibility for banks to oﬀer insurance against the exit “shock”. Below, we discuss the role of central
bank solvency requirements which prevent banks from issuing liabilities in order to generate current proﬁts.
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that deposits are used, the central bank organizes payments and requires banks to settle
net balances using central bank money, which it may oﬀer to lend to them if necessary.
Settlement takes place immediately after exchange through a process that will be described
below. After the settlement of interbank transactions, sub-period 1 ends and sub-period 2,
which is identical, begins.
In sub-period 3 all households have identical preferences and productive capacities but
diﬀer with regard to their asset holdings as a result either of transactions earlier in the
period or of having just arrived in the economy. In this sub-period the sequence of events
does not matter. Banks collect interest on reserves from the central bank, pay interest to
their depositors and pay dividends. The central bank requires repayment of loans to banks
in outside money and requires banks to be solvent at the end of each period. By this we
mean that before paying dividends, banks must demonstrate that any deposits (liabilities)
are matched by assets (loans and outside money).3 Borrowers re-pay their loans and all
households exchange in a Walrasian market. Through exchange households acquire both
goods for consumption and currency to carry into period t + 1.
3This aspect of the central bank‘s policy prevents banks from overissuing inside money. Households will
not have incentive to borrow from banks at the end of any period in exchange for deposits. First, if they
must exit next period they will have no access to these deposits. Second, if they do not exit, then they have
access to loans in the next period after observing their preference shock. Thus, at the end of each period,
there will be no outstanding loans. The solvency requirement thus forces banks’ deposits (if any) to be equal
to their holdings of outside money.
6Monetary policy
The central bank is able to commit fully to state-contingent policy actions. It organizes
payments and conducts a policy with two components. It pays interest on reserves of outside
money held by private banks and makes lump-sum transfers (or collects lump-sum taxes) in
outside money. Interest is paid and taxes/transfers take place during the ﬁnal sub-period
only.
In each of the sub-periods of anonymous exchange, j = 1,2, the central bank sets an
interest rate, ic
j, (possibly contingent on the realizations of the aggregate shocks A1 and A2)
at which it is willing to accept deposits (in units of outside money) from or make loans to
banks. As noted above, loans to banks are repaid in the ﬁnal sub-period. At that time
interest on reserves is paid to the bank holding the deposit at the end of the relevant sub-
period of anonymous exchange.4
In the ﬁnal sub-period, the central bank can adjust the supply of outside money by
choosing the growth rate of the money stock from period t to t + 1:
Mt+1 = γtMt. (3)
Like interest rates, γt can be contingent on the realized shocks. The central bank adjusts
the money stock by conducting equal lump-sum transfers to all households, with the total
transfer equal to (γt−1)Mt minus the total interest paid on reserve deposits to all banks plus
the interest charged on central bank loans (if any). If reserve interest exceeds the desired
increase in the aggregate supply of outside money, then the transfer is negative—a lump-sum
tax.
Transactions, banking, and money ﬂows
A detailed description of the gross monetary ﬂows within each period is given in the
appendix. Having learned their state, households which will continue in the economy may
deposit their currency holdings in banks and/or take out loans. We denote initial deposits
and beginning of period loans made by a representative bank D0 and L1, respectively. Let
id
j denote the net interest paid (in the ﬁnal sub-period) to households who hold deposits in
a bank at the end of sub-period j = 1,2. Similarly, let iℓ
j denote the net interest to be paid
on a loan taken out in sub-period j. Households can choose among diﬀerent banks and may
move their deposits from one to another at any time. Interest on deposits is paid and loans
are re-paid in the ﬁnal sub-period.
4For example, a bank which accepts a deposit from a household at the beginning of sub-period 1 and
then immediately transfers it to another bank through the settlement process following goods trading in
sub-period 1 receives no interest on that deposit as the interest is paid instead to the bank of the seller. If
the ﬁrst bank transfers it to another bank following goods trade in sub-period 2, then it receives interest ic
1
for sub-period 1, but nothing for sub-period 2, etc..
7When a bank makes a loan, it increases the borrower’s deposits resulting in an increase
in the total quantity of deposits in the economy. There is no explicit limit on the quantity of
credit that any bank can extend. At any time private banks may deposit their outside money
reserves at the central bank and earn net interest ic
j, which is paid in the ﬁnal sub-period as
described above on reserves held at the central bank through sub-period j.
We assume that all households with the opportunity deposit in banks any outside money
they either carry into the period or receive in transactions. In this case we can further
assume that exchange involving continuing households takes place using bank deposits only
(for example, by means of checks). There are a large number of symmetric banks, and so we
assume that deposits spent by buyers on goods ﬂow to sellers that are equally distributed
among all banks. Interbank settlement in outside money of net balances takes place imme-
diately following exchange. This settlement process may be thought of as a component of
monetary policy. If an individual bank requires more outside money for settlement than its
collected initial deposits, it must borrow outside money from the central bank at rate ic
j.
After settlement, banks can deposit newly received reserves at the central bank.
The central bank pays interest on reserves held at the end of each sub-period. When a
buyer spends deposits in exchange, reserves associated with these deposits will be transferred
to the bank of seller who receives the deposits in payment. As a result, the seller’s bank will
end up receiving interest from the central bank on these reserves and will pay interest to the
seller on the deposit. The buyer’s bank will receive no interest on reserves and will pay none
to the original depositor.
3 Optimal choices
We now consider households’ optimal choices in a representative time period, t. Agents
behave competitively, taking the central bank’s monetary policy and all prices as given. To
economize on notation, we will omit the subscript “t” throughout. We use “t−1” and “t+1”
to denote the previous and next periods, respectively. Continuing with the case of n = 3,
let p1, p2 and p3 denote the nominal price level in sub-periods 1, 2 and 3, respectively and
let φ = 1
p3 denote the real value of money in the ﬁnal sub-period.
Let V (m) denote the expected value of a representative household at the beginning of the
current period (before the realization of shocks) with m units of outside money. We restrict
attention to situations in which all non-exiting households deposit their money holdings in
banks. Let d0 represent initial nominal wealth. We will construct an expression for V (d0)
(and describe households’ optimal choices) by working backward through period t.
83.1 The ﬁnal sub-period (frictionless market)
Let W(d2,ℓ2) denote the value of a household entering the ﬁnal sub-period with deposits d2
and outstanding loan balance ℓ2. We have
W(d2,ℓ2) = max
x,h,d0,t+1
[U(x) − h + βEtVt+1(d0,t+1)] (4)
subject to : x + φd0,t+1 = h + φτ + φ(1 + i
d
2)d2 + φΠ − φℓ2(1 + i
ℓ
2) (5)
where the budget, (5), is written in units of sub-period 3 consumption good. Here τ denotes
the tax or transfer from the central bank and Π is bank proﬁts, also distributed lump-sum.
Using (5) to eliminate h in (4) we have
W(d2,ℓ2) = φ
￿
τ + Π + (1 + i
d






[U(x) − x − φd0,t+1 + βEtVt+1(d0,t+1)]. (6)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal choice of x and d0,t+1 are given by
U









t+1(d0,t+1) is the expected marginal value of an additional unit of deposits carried
into period t+1 (the expectation here is with respect to the realizations of A1t+1 and A2t+1).
The envelope conditions for d2 and ℓ2 are
Wd = φ(1 + i
d
2) (9)
Wℓ = −φ(1 + i
ℓ
2). (10)
As in Lagos and Wright (2005) the optimal solution for x is the same for all households
and the choice of d0,t+1 is independent of the deposit and loan carried into sub-period 3.5
As a result, all households choose to carry the same quantity of money into period t + 1
and thus have the same deposit balance, d0,t+1, at the beginning of that period. Deﬁne the





5We can adjust U(x) such that people always produce positive amount of goods in sub-period 3 so as to
avoid the corner solution in which people select h = 0. Please see appendix B for details.
93.2 Sub-period 2 (anonymous exchange)
Let V2(d1,ℓ1) denote the value of a household entering the second sub-period of anonymous
exchange with deposits d1 and outstanding loan ℓ1. Households inactive in sub-period 2 were
necessarily active in sub-period 1. Any of these households which will exit this period may
be thought of as already gone at this point. Those that will remain in the economy will
simply roll over their loans and deposits and wait for sub-period 3. For these households we
may therefore write





Households which are active in the second sub-period are divided into buyers (staying
and exiting) and sellers. All of these households have either deposits (d1) or money (m) equal
to d0 and no outstanding loans; ℓ1 = 0. Let V s
2 (d0), V e
2 (d0), and V
y
2 (d0) denote the values of
staying buyers, exiting buyers, and sellers active in the second sub-period respectively.
Sellers
Sellers do not borrow from banks as in any equilibrium the lending rate will be at least
equal to the deposit rate (this is shown below). Thus, sellers’ optimization problem may be
represented by the following Bellman equation:
V
y
2 (d0) = max
y2
[−g(y2) + W(d0(1 + i
d
1) + p2y2 | {z }
d2
,0)] (13)
where y2 is the quantity of goods they sell and p2y2 is their monetary revenue deposited into
their bank on settlement following goods trading. Optimization requires
−g
′(y2) + p2Wd = 0. (14)








Since the marginal cost of producing in sub-period 3 is 1, sellers choose y2 such that the ratio
of marginal costs across markets g′(y2)/1 is equal to the relative nominal price p2φ, multiplied
by the rate of return 1 + id
2 on deposits held through sub-period 2 (after settlement). Thus,






10Buyers who will remain in the economy
All buyers receive preference shock A2. For those that are not exiting this period there
are two possibilities: Either they ﬁnd d0 suﬃcient for the purchases that they would like to
make at the prevailing price level, in which case they do not borrow from banks, or their
deposits are insuﬃcient and they take out a loan. We consider the two cases separately.6
For continuing buyers who choose not to borrow we may write7
V
s
2 (d0) = max
c2
[A2u(c2) + W(d0 − p2c2 + d0i
d
1 | {z }
d2
,0)]. (17)




2) = p2Wd. (18)








If the household wants to take out a loan, the Bellman equation may be written:
V
s







subject to : p2c2 = d0 + ℓ2 (21)




2) = −p2Wℓ (22)








Buyers who will exit at the end of this sub-period are unable to borrow and have no








and their value is given by
V
e






6It can be easily shown that contingent on the loan rate, iℓ
2, there is a critical value of A2 above which
continuing buyers will choose to borrow. This of course may be equal to either the lower or upper support
of the distribution.
7The transfer policy in the ﬁnal sub-period is certain once the state in the second sub-period is known.
113.3 Sub-period 1 (anonymous exchange)
The ﬁrst period of anonymous exchange is similar to the second except that no household
enters with an outstanding loan. Households who are not active in sub-period 1 keep all
their money in banks and the deposit balance that they carry into the second sub-period,
d1, is equal to d0. These households’ value after the realization of shocks in sub-period 1 is
thus given by E1[V2(d0,0)], where the expectation is with respect to A2.
Sellers
The value for a seller active in the ﬁrst sub-period is
V
y
1 (d0) = max
y1






were we have taken into account that a seller active in the ﬁrst sub-period is necessarily
inactive in the second sub-period. The ﬁrst order condition for y1 is
−g
′(y1) + p1(1 + i
d
1)E1Wd = 0. (27)
Using (9), we may write
g


















Buyers who remain in the economy
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d
1)E1Wd. (31)
















1) + E1W(0,ℓ1(1 + i
ℓ
1))] (33)
subject to : p1c
s
1 = d0 + ℓ1. (34)




1) = −p1(1 + i
ℓ
1)E1Wℓ (35)



























and their value is given by
V
e







We now deﬁne and characterize a stationary symmetric monetary equilibrium contingent on
the central bank’s monetary policy (i.e. for a ﬁxed proﬁle of central bank deposit rates, ic
1,
ic
2, and money creation rates γ, all of which we take to be contingent on the realizations of
A1 and A2). We will turn to the optimal selection of these policy variables later.
In a symmetric equilibrium all households of a particular type active in a particular sub-
period make the same choices. Similarly, all banks set the same deposit and loan rates, take
in the same quantity of deposits, make the same loans, receive the same payments, and as
a result earn the same proﬁt. All choices, including the central bank policy are contingent
on the aggregate state variables, A1 and A2. We deﬁne a stationary symmetric monetary
equilibrium as follows:




2, y2 and x;











2; and a central
bank policy ic
1 and ic
2 and γ (all of which are contingent on A1 and A2) such that:
131. Taking the central bank policy and prices as given, households choose quantities to
solve the optimization problems described in the previous section.
2. Taking the central bank policy as given, banks set id
j and iℓ
j in each sub-period to
maximize proﬁts with no bank wanting to deviate individually.
3. Goods markets clear:




1 = (1 − α − λ)y1 (39)




2 = (1 − α − λ)y2 (40)















n = x (41)
4. The market for money clears:
(1 − λ)d0 + λm = M (42)
5. Money has value; i.e. for all t, φt > 0.
We begin our characterization of an equilibrium by deriving some characteristics of bank
deposits and lending rates in any SME. We consider only the case in which banks set short-
term rates in each sub-period. Deposits and loans carried over into sub-period 2 from
sub-period 1 are rolled over at the short-term rates set in the second sub-period, contingent
on the realization of A2.8 The following proposition establishes some properties of lending
and deposit rates in equilibrium:









Thus, in each sub-period the deposit rate and lending rate of private banks will be equal
to the interest rate on reserves set by the central bank. The intuition for this result depends
on two key characteristics of the economy: First, banks compete with each other for deposits
by setting interest rates. Second, there are a large number of banks which must settle their
net balances in outside money.
8We do not consider the case where the interest rates are ﬁxed for two sub-periods. It can be shown,
however, that this assumption does not aﬀect our results. With linear utility of agents in the centralized
market, there is no advantage for them to enter ﬁxed interest rate contracts in the ﬁrst sub-period.
14Consider ﬁrst the equality id
j = ic
j for j = 1,2. When a bank receives a deposit of outside
money from a household, it may deposit it at the central bank and earn ic
j to be paid in the
ﬁnal sub-period. A proﬁt maximizing bank will not oﬀer a rate higher than ic
j on deposits
as this will result in a loss. Banks are willing to pay up to ic
j on deposits of outside money
and will be forced up to this rate by interest rate competition among banks.
The result that iℓ
j = ic
j depends on the settlement requirement. When a bank makes a
new loan in sub-period j, borrowers spend their deposits resulting in an outﬂow of reserves
to other banks (those holding the accounts of the sellers from whom the borrower purchases).
The marginal cost of the new loan is thus the central bank interest that could have been
earned by holding onto these reserves, ic
j. Banks will therefore not be willing to lend for less.
For loans made in the previous sub-period, the opportunity cost for the bank to roll over the
loan and continue to hold it is equal to the new central bank rate on reserves.
Using (8) lagged one period we have
φt−1 = β(Et−1V
′(d0)). (44)
In the appendix we derive an expression for Et−1 [V ′(d0)] in the case in which lending and

















































This equation can be written in terms of ω, with the details depending on the form of
the utility function. Given a monetary policy, a solution to (45) is an SME. Existence
is standard in our economy and the details are essentially the same as those described in
Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007). Since our focus in this paper is on optimal monetary
policy, we do not conduct an analysis similar to theirs here. Rather, before turning to the
analysis of optimal policy, we describe some key properties that an SME must have.
A formal proof of the following proposition is omitted as these results are intuitive and
follow immediately from expressions in Section 3.
Proposition 2. If λ = 0 (no households exit), then there exists a unique symmetric equilib-
rium for which
1. outside money is not essential.
2. the allocation is eﬃcient
15With equal lending and deposit rates (from Proposition 1) equations (19), (23), (32), and
(36) imply eﬃcient consumption and production in sub-periods 1 and 2. From (7) it is
clear that production and consumption are always eﬃcient in the ﬁnal sub-period. It is
also clear that this allocation can be attained without outside money. Consumers borrow
from producers in sub-periods 1 and 2 eﬀectively using private banks as a record-keeping
mechanism. In this case the economy may be viewed as a series of one-period economies and
both existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium is straightforward.
Another straightforward result for which we omit a formal proof is the following:
Proposition 3. If λ > 0 (a positive fraction of households exit), then outside money is
essential.
If λ > 0 but there is no outside money, then there will exist a unique symmetric equilibrium
in which consumers that stay in the economy and producers consume and produce the
same quantities as in the case of λ = 0. In this equilibrium, however, exiting households
will consume nothing (i.e. ce
j = 0 for j=1,2). Valued outside money can improve on this
allocation by enabling these households to consume a positive amount.
While the introduction of outside money can improve welfare, neither its presence nor a
choice of monetary policy can succeed in getting the economy to an eﬃcient allocation in an
SME:
Proposition 4. An SME allocation is not Pareto eﬃcient, regardless of monetary policy,
except in the case of no aggregate uncertainty (i.e. when A is constant).
Proof: In our economy, because all households are ex ante identical and all goods are non-





















We will show that these four equations cannot hold simultaneously in all states in an SME.
As shown in Section 3 above, irrespective of monetary policy, in any SME (46) and (48) hold
in all states. In this sense, buyers that will continue in the economy always consume the
“right” amount. Thus we focus here on a basic tension between (47) and (49).



























is the real return associated with holding a unit of money through sub-period 2 and into the







an expression which must hold in any SME in which (46)—(49) are satisﬁed.
































≡ (1 + i
c
1)E1 [r2] (54)
is the “long-run” gross real interest rate associated with holding money from sub-period 1.







Since (46)—(49) are required to hold in all states, consider a state in which A1 = A2 = A.














17or, r2 = rL. But, since rL ≡ (1 + ic
1)E1[r2] and ic
1 ≥ 0 we have
rL ≥ E1[r2] or r2 ≥ E1[r2] (58)
which, of course, can hold only if r2 is constant across states. Thus, for any monetary policy
that does not maintain a constant r2, (46)—(49) cannot be maintained in all states and
an SME allocation is not Pareto eﬃcient. At the same time, it is straightforward to show,
given the properties of u( ) and g( ), that any monetary policy which maintains a constant r2
across states is inconsistent with maintaining (46)—(49) in all states, except in the extreme
case in which there are no aggregate shocks (A constant). Thus, irrespective of monetary
policy, if A is not constant, then the allocation in any SME is not Pareto eﬃcient. ￿
Note that Proposition 4 relies on there being at least two sub-periods of anonymous
exchange. If there is only one, then the central bank can always attain the ﬁrst-best by
choice of either γt =
φ
φt−1 or ic so that the analog of (52) holds in all states. Also, the
key source of friction here is the incentive of exiting households to overconsume. In our
economy, these households cannot be induced to save by any policy aﬀecting interest rates.
This assumption is admittedly extreme, and in our concluding section we discuss ways to
relax it without changing either the basic result of Proposition 4 or the qualitative aspects
the optimal policy derived in Section 5.
We now illustrate some properties of an SME, including its ineﬃciency, for an example
in which monetary policy is entirely passive. The central bank maintains a constant money
stock (i.e. γt = 1 for all t) and sets its short-term interest rates, ic
1 and ic
2 equal to zero
regardless of the realizations of A1 and A2. Note that in this case r2 is indeed a constant.
We choose the following parameters and functional forms more or less arbitrarily since they
do not matter much for the qualitative aspects of the equilibrium. We set the discount factor
β = 0.99 and let utility be logarithmic: u(c) = lnc. We set g(y) = y +
1
2y2. We let A be
uniformly distributed on [0.4,1.1] in each sub-period. We set α = 0.6 and λ = 0.2. The
larger the share of buyers that do not exit the economy, α, the higher aggregate bank lending
whenever Aj is suﬃciently high that these buyers would like to borrow. The larger the share
of buyers that exit, λ, the larger the aggregate welfare loss associated with their exclusion
from the banking system and subsequent sub-optimal consumption.









































β − (1 − λ)E[rL]
. (61)





Since in this case ic
1 = ic




β − (1 − λ)
. (63)
In the appendix we calculate equilibrium quantities and prices. Figure 2 illustrates these
for the ﬁrst sub-period as functions of A1. The ﬁgure can summarized as follows:
1. Both production and the sub-period 1 real price are increasing in A1.
2. The consumption of buyers that do not exit is increasing in A1. In contrast, that of
buyers who do exit decreases with A1 as the increase in the price level erodes their real
balances, given that their nominal balance is ﬁxed at m = d0.
3. When A1 is suﬃciently high, the loan balance is positive and the aggregate money
supply exceeds the quantity of outside money.
4. For high values of A1 the marginal utility of buyers who exit exceeds sellers’ marginal
cost. In this case, exiting buyers under-consume. Conversely, for low values of A1,
exiting buyers over-consume and their marginal utility is below marginal cost.
We do not describe sub-period 2 in detail because sub-periods of anonymous exchange are
largely symmetric and diﬀer signiﬁcantly only with regard to the aggregate loan balance and
total money supply. The total outstanding loan in sub-period 2 is the new loans plus those
extended in the previous sub-period (and rolled over). Similarly, the total money supply in
sub-period 2 is measured by total deposits some of which are created in each of the ﬁrst two
sub-periods.
To understand the relationships depicted in Figure 2, note ﬁrst that with ic
j = 0 in all
































(a) Production of each seller















(b) Real Price (p1φt−1)






















(c) Consumption by non-exiting buy-
ers






















(d) Consumption of exiting buyers
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aggregate loan balance 
(e) Total Loans and Money

























marginal utility of 
exiting buyers      
marginal cost of sellers 
(f) Marginal utilities and costs
Figure 2: Sub-period 1 in an example with passive monetary policy.
20With a constant money stock, φ = φt−1, and p1φt−1 = g′(y1). When an increase in A1 raises
households’ demand for goods, marginal cost increases and p1φt−1 must rise. An increase
in both the quantity produced and the real price level is ﬁnanced by newly created inside
money. Since the total money supply is stochastic (it depends on A1), p1 is as well. An
increase in p1 reduces exiting buyers’ real balances and so lowers their consumption and
utility. Inside money creation therefore redistributes wealth from exiting buyers to those
that remain in the economy.
Because the inﬂation rate is controlled by outside money growth γ, the increase in the
nominal price, p1 (and in p2 as well) is only temporary and the price level must subsequently
fall between sub-periods 1 and 3. Since bank loans are repaid in sub-period 3 and households
carry only outside money into the next period, the creation of inside money aﬀects the price
level only in the short-run and does not contribute to long-run inﬂation.
5 Optimal monetary policy
We now consider the problem of a central bank which solves a “Ramsey” problem. That is,
it chooses a policy to maximize social welfare subject to the constraint that (45) hold (i.e.
that the resulting allocation be an SME allocation). We have already shown that given its
instruments, the central bank cannot attain the ﬁrst-best.
The welfare criterion
We assume that the central bank maximizes the expected utility of households present
in the economy at the beginning of the current period (period t) plus the expected utility
of all households that will enter in the future discounted by the factor β. At the beginning
of the current period the expected lifetime utility of a representative household with money
holdings m = d0 is denoted E[V (d0)]. Similarly, the expected utility of a household that will







n]dF(A2)dF(A1) + βEt [Vt+1(d0,t+1)]. (65)
Since the environment is stationary, the central bank maximizes








Multiplying by (1 − β) deﬁne the central bank’s objective by
W ≡ (1 − β)E[V (d0)] + λWn. (67)
21Making use of the optimization problems in Section 3 we may expand V (d0) and combine



































1 − α − λ
￿￿
dF(A2)dF(A1),
where since x is a constant we can ignore U(x) and x for policy analysis.










2) − (1 − α − λ)g(y2) (70)
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 5. A monetary policy: ic
1(A1), ic
2(A1,A2), and γ(A1,A2) maximizes W subject
to (45) if it maximizes W1 + E1W2 subject to (45).
Proof: See appendix.
The optimal policy
We ﬁrst partially characterize analytically the policy which maximizes W1+E1[W2], and
then turn to a computed example. To begin with, note that the central bank sets r∗
2 and r∗
L
using (52) and (55), respectively, whenever A1 is such that the zero bound on ic
1
∗ is slack.
This is consistent with many diﬀerent choices of ic
2
∗(A1,A2) and γ∗(A1,A2), including the
possibility of setting ic
2
∗ = 0 in all of these states and varying only the inﬂation rate through
taxes and transfers in sub-period 3. For each choice of ic
2
∗ and γ∗, however, the optimal
policy requires a unique choice of ic
1
∗(A1). Note that for each realization A1 for which the
zero bound is not hit, (46)—(49) hold regardless of the realization of A2.
If A1 is suﬃciently low that continuing households do not wish to spend all of their money
holdings in exchange, then the central bank will want to discourage over-consumption by
exiting households that are active in the ﬁrst period. Since it does not have the ability to
tax these households directly, the central bank can lower their consumption only by raising
the price level, p1, to erode the value of their money holdings. Because of the zero bound,
however, the only way to raise p1 is to reduce rL by lowering E1r∗
2. The following proposition
describes the central bank’s optimal choice of r2 across states:
Proposition 6. Given A1 ∈ A, under the optimal policy
∂W2(A2)






, ∀A2 ∈ A. (71)
22Proof: See appendix.
The intuition for this proposition is straightforward. Given E1[r2], the central bank will
vary r∗
2 across states to equate ∂W2(A2)/∂r2. If it did not do so, then welfare could be
improved by providing better insurance in sub-period 2 without aﬀecting sub-period 1 in
any way (i.e. without changing E1[r2]). At the same time, the central bank must choose
E1[r2] so as to equate the marginal gains from providing insurance in the ﬁrst sub-period
to the marginal loss associated with lower short-term real interest rates in sub-period 2,
conditional on the realization of A1.
A numerical example
Figure 3 illustrates the key aspects of the optimal monetary policy for the example
economy introduced in Section 4. Again we view this example as purely illustrative rather





L as functions of A1 under the optimal policy. Panel (d) depicts realized r∗
2 as a function of
A2 conditional on some speciﬁc values of A1.
As Aj rises in either sub-period, continuing households’ demand increases. In sub-period
2, the central bank increases r∗
2 with A2 in all states to protect the exiting households active
in that sub-period from a rising price level by limiting money creation and encouraging sellers
to supply more at a given price. In sub-period 1, the central bank pursues the same goal by
increasing r∗
L with A1.
With log utility, for any state in which A1 ≥ E[A], continuing buyers want to borrow,
and the central bank sets r∗
2 according to the highest (solid line) schedule for r∗
2 in panel (d).
Thus E1[r∗
2] is constant across all of theses states. Because E1[r∗
2] is constant, the central
bank can only vary r∗
L in these states by raising ic
1
∗ above zero and making it increasing
in A1. As noted earlier, in these states all buyers consume equally and eﬃciently. Thus,
the combination of a constant E1[r∗
2] and a positive ic
1
∗ eﬀectively “cools down” an economy
which would otherwise be “overheated” in the sense that high money creation to satisfy the
demand of continuing buyers would raise the price level excessively and harm households
who exit.
If A1 < E[A] (again, for the case of log utility), the central bank discourages over-
consumption by exiting households active in sub-period 1 by lowering r∗
L. It cannot, however,
achieve this by further lowering ic
1
∗, because of the zero bound. Rather, the central bank
must reduce E1[r∗
2]. The entire schedule for r∗
2 thus shifts down as A1 falls. In panel (d) the
dashed line depicts the schedule for the case in which A1 is at its lower support. As shown
above, this policy cannot attain the ﬁrst-best. Because of the zero bound the central bank
cannot generate enough demand from continuing households to erode the value of exiting








































































































































2  when A
1 >=  EA 
(d) r∗
2
Figure 3: Interest rates under the optimal policy.
24household’s money holdings without violating (71) and reducing welfare.
The value of ic
1
∗ in each state is unique under the optimal policy. The implied nominal
central bank rate in the second sub-period (ic
2
∗) is, however, indeterminate. An optimal
nominal rate can, though, be calculated from (52) and (51) for a given choice of inﬂation
target,
φ
φt−1. Overall, it is clear from Figure 3 that it is not optimal for the central bank to
maintain zero nominal interest rates in all states, regardless of its inﬂation policy. That is,
the nominal interest rate is a necessary component of the optimal policy.
6 Implications of the optimal policy for long-run inﬂa-
tion
The optimal policy is characterized in the second sub-period by the real return r∗
2. This
implies that the central bank can use many diﬀerent combinations of ic
2
∗ and γ∗ to carry out
the required policy. For example, in any state the central bank can set ic
2
∗ = 0, provided

















2 in each state.9 In this case, however, the constant inﬂation rate must be high
enough so that ic
2
∗ never hits the zero bound. Deﬁne the lowest constant money creation







2 is the minimum of r2 in any state under the optimal policy.








Clearly, maintaining a constant inﬂation rate over time requires a higher trend inﬂation rate
than any optimal policy which makes use of a time-varying inﬂation rate. Trend inﬂation
can be minimized by setting ic
2










9We may think of a constant inﬂation policy in this economy as corresponding to the “price-level targeting”
policy of Berentsen and Waller (2010). In this case, the price level follows a deterministic path.
25The minimum trend inﬂation rate consistent with optimal policy depends on the parameters
of the economy. Clearly, however, comparing (75) with (73) we have γL > ¯ γL. The minimum
average inﬂation rate under the optimal policy can be positive and in principle quite large.
The following table contains γL and ¯ γL for diﬀerent distributions of shocks. Here we
maintain the assumption of a uniform distribution and change the variance by changing the
length of the interval [AL,AH].
Table 1






The last line of Table 1 contains γL and ¯ γL for our parametric example. Note that when A
is constant (i.e. there are no shocks) the minimum constant inﬂation rate is equal to the
discount factor, β, and there is no need for time varying inﬂation. In this case the optimal
policy (constant deﬂation) attains the ﬁrst-best.
7 Conclusion
We have characterized an optimal interest rate based monetary policy in an environment in
which money plays an essential role as the medium of exchange and aggregate shocks aﬀect
households, some of which have no access to the banking system, asymmetrically. Using
short-run interest rates the central bank can improve welfare by exploiting the eﬀect of
inside money creation on the distribution of wealth. The optimal monetary policy requires
the central bank to set positive short-term nominal interest rates in some states. It does not
attain the ﬁrst-best and its implementation requires suﬃcient long-run inﬂation.
As noted above, the incentive of at least some households to overconsume in some states is
central to our results. Here we have modeled this by assuming that a fraction of households
is unwilling to save under any circumstance. Similar results can be achieved, however,
without totally eliminating any household’s incentive to save. Suppose that whenever any
agent carries cash following anonymous exchange, they are robbed (or simply lose their
money) with probability δ before entering the frictionless market. Then, suppose that as in
the current model, fraction λ of households are buyers who have no access to the banking
26system in the current period. In this case, regardless of monetary policy, buyers excluded
from the banking system have incentive to overconsume in states when A is suﬃciently low.
The result of Propositions 4 and 6 continue to hold, and the optimal policy is qualitatively
similar to that present in Figure 3. Our current model may be thought of as corresponding
to the case of δ = 1.
We have abstracted from several phenomena which are clearly of importance to the role
of the banking system in the implementation of monetary policy. For example, we ignore
default risk associated with bank loans and we have assumed that the central bank has
suﬃcient powers to prevent banks from becoming insolvent in any state. We are exploring
the implications of relaxing these potentially restrictive assumptions in separate research.
8 Appendices
A Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
We ﬁrst consider the deposit rate id. In the ﬁrst sub-period, if households deposit outside
money, then the bank can deposit the outside money into the central bank and earn ic
1.
If households make deposits by transferring deposits from other banks, then the bank will
receive an equal amount of outside money. So banks are willing to oﬀer ic
1 to attract new
deposits. This implies that banks must also oﬀer ic
1 to existing deposits in order to prevent
households from switching to other banks. Thus, id
1 = ic
1. In the second sub-period, the
deposit rate is decided in the same way, and so id
2 = ic
2.
Next, we consider the lending rate. In the ﬁrst sub-period, when a bank makes new loans
L, an equivalent amount of deposits will be created. After the borrower spends the money,
N−1
N L will be paid to sellers in other banks, and 1
NL will be paid to sellers in the same bank.
Due to the inter-bank settlement process, the ﬁnal change is a net decrease in reserve by
N−1
N L and a net increase in sellers’ deposit in the same bank by 1
NL. The opportunity cost
for reserve is ic


















In the second sub-period, for new loans, the lending rate is decided in the same way
as in the ﬁrst sub-period. For existing loans, the opportunity cost is the return that could
have been earned if the bank asked the borrower to repay the loan. If the borrower repays
27the loan using outside money, then the money can be used to earn ic
2. It would the same
if the loan is repaid using deposits from other banks because the bank will receive outside
money after settlement. If the loan is repaid using the deposits of the same bank, then the
opportunity cost is the deposit interest, which is also ic
2. As a result, iℓ
2 = ic
2. ￿
A.2 Calculating equilibrium quantities
These quantities are useful for producing Figures 2 and 3.
The second sub-period

















The ﬁrst equation is the ﬁrst order condition of continuing buyers, the second equation is






In our example, we have u′(cs) = 1




= 1 + y2 (79)






Using (79) to replace y2 in (80), we have






















2 + (1 − α − λ)c
s
2 − A(1 − α − λ) = 0 (81)
The positive root of (81) is the equilibrium cs
2.
The nominal loan level for each continuing buyer is ℓ = cs
2p2−d0. Since Au′(cs
2) = g′(y2),






















The aggregate quantity of new loans is L = 1
2αℓ2 and the aggregate money supply is M +
L1+L2 where L1 and L2 are new deposits created through loans in the two sub-periods with
anonymous exchange.









Using (83), we then have that the lending takes place whenever
A2 > ωr2. (84)
The ﬁrst sub-period

















where we use the result that the consumption of exiting buyer is ce
1 = d0/p1 =
ωrL
g′(y1). Com-
paring (79) and (80) to (85) and (86), we can now solve for the ﬁrst sub-period equilibrium
quantities by replacing r2 in (81) by rL. Clearly, equilibrium output and consumption in the
second sub-period depend only on ωr2, and in the ﬁrst sub-period they depend only on ωrL.
This is true not only for the example, but also when u( ) and g( ) take general forms. We
make use of this result in the proofs which follow.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Deﬁne W1+E1W2 as Ws, then (68) can be written as W =
R
A1 WsdF(A1). Let A1(i) denote
state i of A1. The interest rate policy in A1(i) will aﬀect the welfare in other states indirectly
only through the level of ω. If we can show that under the optimal policy
∂Ws(j)
∂ω = 0 in







then when the zero bound is binding, given A1, e ξ2 is the same in all states in the second
sub-period.
Proof: From the equilibrium solution, we know that the equilibrium production and con-








= e ξ2ω (88)
29We will show in Proposition 6 that
∂W2
∂r2 is the same in every state of the second sub-period,







e ξ1 = −e ξ2 (90)









= e ξ1ω (91)




∂r2 . Using lemma 1, we get e ξ1ω = −e ξ2ω, thus (90).
￿
Using (69) and (70),
∂Ws























where we have omitted the terms associated with Au′(cs) − g′(y) because they are zero. In
those states where the zero bound is not binding, (92) is zero because Au′(ce) − g′(y) = 0
holds on both markets.
When the zero bound is binding, since the equilibrium output and consumption on the
ﬁrst sub-period only depend on ωrL = ωE1r2, and the equilibrium quantities on the second





























= e ξ1E1r2 + e ξ2E1 [r2] = 0 (94)
where we use the result of lemma 1 that e ξ2 is the same in all states in the second sub-period
and the result of lemma 2 that e ξ1 + e ξ2 = 0.
The result means that the marginal eﬀects of ω on the ﬁrst sub-period and the second
sub-period will exactly oﬀset each other under the optimal policy. ￿
30A.4 Proof of proposition 6
Proposition 6 says that given A1,
∂W2(A2)







Proof: It is easy to see that the above results will hold when the zero bound is not
binding because the derivatives are zero. When the zero bound is binding, the central bank
would reduce the expected interest rate in the second sub-period in order to achieve a better
outcome in the ﬁrst sub-period. Given the optimal E1r2, the central bank would choose the
distribution of r2 such that the welfare can not be further improved. Let i and j denote any
of the two states in the second sub-period, then it must be the case that if we change r2(i)
and r2(j) marginally in such a way that E1r2 is not changed, then the marginal change in
social welfare should be zero, otherwise, the social welfare can be further improved.
Suppose we change r2(i) by ∆r2(i), then the change in r2(j) that maintains the same
E1r2 should satisfy
∆r2(i)f(Ai) + ∆r2(j)f(Aj) = 0 (96)






∆r2(j)f(Aj) = 0 (97)









∂r2 is the same in all states in the second sub-period.














































where we use the result that rL = E1r2 when the zero bound is binding.
∂r2
∂E1r2 is the optimal














31because the average changes in r2 is the same as the change in E1r2. As a result, we get
(95). ￿
B Production and monetary ﬂows in the equilibrium
In this appendix we show the details of production, consumption and money ﬂows in equi-
librium. In the exposition that follows, we assume that preference shocks are suﬃciently
high that bank loans are positive in both markets. Analysis of cases in which no borrowing
takes place is similar, although slightly simpler, and is therefore omitted here.
B.1 Consumption and production
Let m denote the nominal money balance carried by every household into sub-period 1 in
period t. We assume that all continuing households (consumers and sellers) deposit their
money in banks. Exiting households have no access to banks and therefore hold on to their
cash themselves. Thus we have M = (1 − λ)d0 + λm, where d0 = m.
In sub-period 1, each continuing buyer spends d0+ℓ1, each exiting buyer spends m = d0,
and each seller earns
α(d0+ℓ1)+λd0
1−α−λ . Consumption is cs
1 =
d0+ℓ1
p1 for continuing buyers with
ℓ1 = cs
1p1 − d0. Exiting buyers consume ce
1 = m






In the symmetric equilibrium, id
1 = iℓ
1 = ic
1. Bank reserves are initially equal to the
beginning of period deposit, (1 − λ)d0. After exchange and settlement, reserves are equal




2 is the money spent by exiting buyers in sub-period 1. These
reserves accrue interest for the ﬁrst sub-period at rate ic
1.
In sub-period 2, deposit and loan balances carried from sub-period 1 are rolled over at
second sub-period interest rate. Bank reserves increase by
λd0
2 following settlement as sellers
deposit their income, including money spent by exiting buyers active in sub-period 2.
In sub-period 3, equation (7) gives x∗ = U′−1(1). The transfer required to ensure that
the money supply grows at gross rate γ is given by



































2) − 1] and the net interest on the increase in reserves due to the




32In an SME, bank proﬁts (Π) equal zero. As L1 and L2 denote new loans issued in the
ﬁrst and second sub-periods, respectively, we can also use them to denote the loans extended






















2) + L2(1 + i
ℓ
2)






























2) = 0 (105)
The ﬁrst term is the gross return from depositing the banks’ reserve with the central bank.
The second and the third terms are associated with payment of bank loans. The fourth term
is the payment for sellers’ initial deposit. The ﬁfth term is the payment for sellers’ income
earned in the ﬁrst sub-period, where the spending of exiting buyers is
λ
2M, and the spending
of continuing buyers is α
2M +L1. Similarly, the sixth term is the payment for sellers’ income
from the second sub-period. The last term is the interest payment the accrued interest of
buyers active in the second sub-period. Using the results of Proposition 1, (105) is equal to
zero.
At the end of the ﬁnal sub-period, all households carry the same nominal balance, mt+1 =




















































































For sellers active in the ﬁrst sub-period, the initial deposit is d0 and sales revenue is
α(d0+ℓ1)+λd0











α(d0 + ℓ1) + λd0

















α(d0 + ℓ1) + λd0



















α(d0 + ℓ2) + λd0















α(d0 + ℓ2) + λd0






Finally, the production of the newly arrived households is
h
n = x


































From (110), hn > 0. Since in most cases, sellers active in the ﬁrst sub-period produce the
smallest quantity of goods in the ﬁnal sub-period, we show here that h
y
1 > 0. A similar
argument can be used to establish that h
y
2 > 0.
Using (108) and making use of the result that id
j = ic
j in an SME, h
y
























1 − α − λ
(112)
In our economy, equilibrium real balances, ω, output, and consumption in the sub-periods of
anonymous exchange do not depend on U(x). So, U(x) can be chosen so that x∗ = U′−1(1)
is equal to any ﬁnite number. Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that the second and third terms
on the RHS of (112) are bounded. If they are, then the model may be parameterized so as
to ensure that h∗ > 0 in an SME for all households.
Since in equilibrium d0 + ℓ1 = p1cs























Boundedness of the second term of the RHS of (112) thus hinges on that of the RHS of (113).
Since we focus on equilibrium under the optimal policy, 0 < E1[r2] < ∞ and that r2/E1[r2]
is bounded. E1r2 = 0 would imply r2 = 0 for all A2. Such a policy is clearly sub-optimal
because it implies that money has no value in sub-period 2 and so forces ce
2 = 0. Similarly,
r2 = ∞ is not consistent with equilibrium because it implies a nominal prices level of zero in
sub-period 2. Similarly, it is clear that g′(y1)cs
1 is also bounded as cs
1 satisﬁes Au′(cs
1) = g′(y1).
Overall, the expression deﬁned by (113) is bounded and so the second term on the RHS of
(112) is bounded as well. Moreover, since φd0ic
1(1+ic
2) < φ(d0 +ℓ1)(1+ic
1)(1+ic
2), the third
term on the RHS of (112) is smaller than the second term, and we have that h
y
1 > 0.
34B.2 The creation and circulation of money
Table 2 illustrates the ﬂows of money in an SME using the balance sheet of a representative
bank. Since M is the stock of outside money, at the beginning of sub-period 1, reserves and
deposits both equal (1 − λ)M. In sub-period 1, bank loans result in an increase of both
deposits (liabilities) and loans (assets) by L1. When continuing buyers make purchases their
deposits are transferred to sellers who also deposit any cash they receive from exiting buyers.
The additional deposits raise bank reserves one-for-one, by λ
2M. This pattern repeats in the
second sub-period.
In the ﬁnal sub-period, the order in which the gross ﬂows depicted in 2 take place does
not matter. For illustrative purposes only, consider the following order: First, the central
bank pays interest on reserves to banks using outside money. The central bank then makes
the transfer, which changes households’ deposits and bank reserves by the same amount.
Banks pay interest to depositors by crediting their deposits. Next, bank loans are repaid.
When continuing buyers from the ﬁrst sub-period repay their loans, deposits equal to L1(1+
iℓ
1)(1+iℓ
2) are destroyed. Similarly, when continuing buyers from the second sub-period repay
their loans, bank deposits are reduced by L2(1 + iℓ
2). Finally, all households exchange their
deposits for goods and outside money so as to consume x∗ and carry the (common) optimal
real balance, ω, into the next period.
To summarize, deposits are created when banks make loans, sellers deposit cash income,
the central bank transfers, and when banks pay deposit interest. All of the deposits created
here λM + M(γ − 1) + L1[(1 + iℓ)(1 + iℓ
2)] + L2(1 + iℓ
2). L1[(1 + iℓ)(1 + iℓ
2)] + L2(1 + iℓ
2) are
eliminated when loans are repaid. The net change in bank deposits is λM +M(γ−1), where
λM is the cash income earned by sellers from exiting buyers, and M(γ − 1) is equal to the
change in outside money as a result of the central bank’s policy.
C The derivation of Et−1[V ′(d0)]
Collecting expressions from Section 3, we have


































(1 − α − λ)E1
￿














35Table 2: The creation, circulation and destruction of inside money
Commercial Bank Balance sheet (With positive loan)
Asset Side Liability side
Reserve Loan Loan Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit Bank
(continuing (continuing (continuing (sellers 1) (continuing (sellers 2) (newly arrived) equity
buyers 1) buyers 2) buyers 1) buyers 2)
Initial Balance






2 M 0 0
Changes in Sub-period 1
Bank makes loans +L1 +L1
Buyers consume −L1 − α





Changes in Sub-period 2
Bank makes loans +L2 +L2
Buyers consume −L2 − α





Changes in Sub-period 3
Central bank +(1 − λ
2)M[(1 + ic
1) +(1 − λ
2)M[(1 + ic
1)
pays the interest (1 + ic
2) − 1] + λ
2Mic
2 (1 + ic
2) − 1] + λ
2Mic
2








Bank pays the +(L1 + M





2 M[(1 + id
1) -sum1
deposit interest (1 + id
2) − 1] (1 + id






Sellers spend the +Income(1) −SP1 +Income(2) −SP2 +Incomen
extra deposit
Buyers repay −L1 −L1(1 + iℓ
1) +L1[(1 + iℓ
1)
the bank loan (1 + iℓ
2) (1 + iℓ
2) − 1]








2 Mγ λMγ 0
1. “sum1” is the sum of the interest payment in the same row.
2. SP1 and SP2 are spending of sellers active in sub-period 1 and sub-period 2, respectively. We use Income(1), Income(2), and Incomen to denote the income
of continuing buyers active in sub-period 1 and 2, and the newly arrived households, respectively. Their levels can be computed using the ﬁnal balance in the
balance sheet. For example, for the newly arrived households, we have
0(initial balance) + λτ + Incomen = λMγ(ﬁnal balance) =⇒ Incomen = λ(Mγ − τ) (114)
3












































































































































For sellers active in the ﬁrst sub-period,
∂y1
∂d0 = 0 because the choice of qs is independent




























+ (1 + i
d
1)E1Wd = (1 + i
d
1)E1Wd (117)



























− (1 + i
ℓ
1)E1Wℓ = −(1 + i
ℓ
1)E1Wℓ (118)
where we use (35).
Similarly, for sellers active in the second sub-period,
∂y2
∂d0 = 0. For continuing buyers in






















2) − p2Wd) + Wd(1 + i
d
1) = Wd(1 + i
d
1) (119)
10Let Abj denote the critical value of Aj at which continuing buyers wish to borrow.






















2) + Wℓp2) − Wℓ + Wdi
d
1 = −Wℓ + Wdi
d
1 (120)
where we use (22).
Using Wd = φ(1+id
2) and Wℓ = −φ(1+iℓ
2), and also the result that lending rate is equal
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